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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
DON ENOCH PETERSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030704-CA 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for Child Abuse, a Class A 
Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109 (2002), in the Third Judicial 
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Denise P. 
Lindberg, Judge, presiding. A copy of the judgment is in Addendum A. 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether Child Abuse, a Class A Misdemeanor, found in Utah Code Ann. § 76-
5-109(3)(a) requires defendant to intend to cause the resulting abuse. 
Standard of Review: This issue concerns statutory construction, which is reviewed 
for correctness. State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996). 
2. Whether the state presented sufficient evidence to convict defendant/appellant 
Don Enoch Peterson ("Don" "Peterson" "Mr. Peterson") of intentional child abuse when it 
failed to present evidence as to defendant's mental state. 
Standard of Review; Sufficiency of the evidence is reviewed as follows: 
We reverse the jury's verdict in a criminal case when we conclude as a matter of 
law that the evidence was insufficient to warrant conviction. State v. Harman. 767 
P.2d 567, 568 (Utah App. 1989). Nevertheless, "the standard for reversal is high." 
Id We will reverse only if the evidence is so '"inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime."' Id. (quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 
444 (Utah 1983)); accord State v. Bradley. 752 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 1985). We 
review from a perspective most favorable to the verdict the evidence and all 
inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence, recognizing that determinations 
regarding witness credibility are solely within the jury's province. Harman. 767 
P.2d at 568. 
State v. Smith. 927 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Both issues were preserved by defense counsel's motion to dismiss, made at page 
66 in the record on appeal. See R.70 [66]. 
RELEVANT STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statutes will be determinative of the issue on appeal: Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-2-103, 76-5-109. The text of those statutes is found in Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 25, 2003, the state charged Don Enoch Peterson ("Don"; "Peterson") 
with one count of Child Abuse under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109 (2002). On July 14, 
2003, after a jury trial, Peterson was found guilty of Intentional Child Abuse, as found in 
Utah Code Ann § 76-5-109(3)(a). 
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O .j =• • :• I. ?003, the trial court sentenced Peterson to a term of 365 days to be 
served consecutively to any otlier time serving. On August 23, 2003, Peterson filed a 
timely Notice of Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On November 27, 2002, between 10 and 11 a.m., Andrea Camphcii dropped her 
two-year old ....... . >..! *:i U'MCC • ; ' ' *'ha% 
Don I i • -, h T* • • '5-36: ~ 1 j. Don was to tend the child at his parent's house 
while Andrea did some work for the day R.70 [35-36]. When Andrea returned—between 
3 and 4 p.m.—she noticed red marks on the child's neck, t
 ; <•, . V>n was acting 
funny, sue >au.. * i: :la.i:t i: led tl: lat it 
r 'v noned while he and Matthew were roughhousing that afternoon. R.70 [3o, 
80-81]. Andrea thought the discoloration on Matthew's neck was not the result of 
wrestling, so she persisted in querying tM MI k , - f .;.. n)|. . .,.,i then admiue*. 
l . i a i A . - , • • • * ; < ! h ' d l h •• ' < 4 ' ' < . ' . 
jumping too quickly to a false conclusion. R.70 [40, 80-81]. 
Don told the court that Matthew was eating his lunch when Don's mother stepped 
outside of the home. > . • J- / 3 j. Mdtmew wanted to go OLIMUC W un nis grandmother, 
Don i ealized it, the child made a dash for the door. R.70 [40, 73 j . In an effort to catch the 
escaping child, Don leaped for Matthew, attempting to grab the boy's shoulders. R.70 
[40, 74-75]. Unfortunately, Don's hands slid to the child's neck. R.70 [74]. Don told 
Andrea that he did not lift Matthew: "[Matthew's] feet never left the ground. I grabbed 
him by the body, right by the side of the arms and led him to the table." R.70 [40, 75]. 
Andrea did not talk to police, claiming she was "torn between what to do" because 
she was to marry Don within a week (which she eventually did). R.70 [41, 43]. But 
apparently someone else anonymously called police. R.70 [44-45]. Acting on that tip, 
officers showed up at Andrea's house around 10 or 10:30 p.m. R.70 [41]. 
Officer Josh Woffinden of the Midvale City Police Department stated that the 
marks on the child were "very red and very noticeable." R.70 [51]. Officers took pictures 
of the boy. R.70 [51]. Based on Officer Woffinden's experience, of about a year on the 
police force and a "couple of cases like [this one]", he concluded that the marks were 
consistent with "being grabbed" on the neck. R.70 [51]. The officer did mention that the 
child, Matthew, did not ever speak to police or indicate in any manner that he had been 
harmed by Don. R.70 [55-56, 61]. 
Andrea gave officers Don's phone number, and Officer Woffinden called between 
9:45 and 11:16 p.m. that evening R.70 [52]. Don testified that he returned from work 
between 11 and midnight and had a message to call officers. R.70 [76]. He returned 
Woffinden's call. R.70 [76-77]. Woffinden asked Don about the incident that day. R.70 
[53], Don reiterated what he had told Andrea and explained "that he wasn't trying to hurt 
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M JP needed help. R.70 I ^ 4). Don admitted that he had an anger 
problem and ihat counseling would be beneficial. R.70 [79]. Don professed that 
afternoon, he had simply "lost u." K."'u | • . j. 
1 l i e ])A-\ s -f . a . ,•-. T l f - - H , ? : ! ! i - M l 
inferred that Don meant he had lost his temper when Matthew ran from the table. R.70 
[54]. Don, on the other hand, claimed he meant that he had lost control of the outcome, 
R 70 [78]. He did H»M l»>se Ins temper, nor did he Jose contn-- v>i ins action. ; 
didi f't: i i leai I t : I n in: 11; i in ' s> : i i ," ' 1: le stated R 70 [' 78] "Tit i i ^  ' er ;; ' sot r ] • tl: lat 11 
I didn't at all want to do that. I didn't at all set out to do that," Don averred. R.70 [78]. 
S U M M A R Y Q F T H E A R G U M h i N 1 
. "1 he Male piY^"- 1-- 1 • • <M.'n.^ -,: • . .• fj iat defei idant , • ^ I -•«•• i; *v?rrsnn had h-.cr-
the person who had placed his hand on Matthew's neck. But the state was unable to 
present any evidence of Peterson's mental state to the jury. It presented the marks on the 
boy's neck. It presented Peterson s own statements to his wiic and iu a ponce omcer in 
v • 1 lie! t 11 i ::: :laii i led re sponsibility for grabbii lg tl: le boy Bi it tl: le state did i i :::)t pi e sei it 
evidence that Peterson intended to injure Matthew. According to Peterson's own 
testimony and his statements to both his wife and the officer, he intended to grab the 
boy's shoulders and lead ;,,;,. ,*> ine table to Jimsn eaiin^ in.*-, lun^n. . .;.;:. ._:. ; 
slipped • l[ ' * t r r ^ < " •' <e ^< \ <i(*.*i! 
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The child abuse statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109, and the mental state statute, 
found in Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 expressly mandate that one must have one of three 
mental states in order to be found guilty of a Class A intentional child abuse: one must 1) 
intend to inflict physical injury on a child, 2) intend the resulting injury, or 3) engage in 
conduct "reasonably certain" to cause physical injury to the child. The state presented no 
evidence which fits within any of these mental states, so Peterson's conviction for 
intentional child abuse cannot stand. 
Peterson's failure to immediately take responsibility when first talking to Andrea 
about the marks on Matthew's neck and his subsequent acknowledgment to officers that 
he had an anger problem did not prove that he intended to cause physical injury. His 
refusal to initially take responsibility, according to the Utah Supreme Court, has no 
relevance as to his intent. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 789-90 (Utah 1991). Plus, the 
anger or temper problems are only an indication of recklessness, not of intent. See State v. 
Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985). The Bolsinger case was much more extreme in its 
evidence against its defendant, yet the Court still dropped the offense from intentional to 
reckless because the state had provided no evidence on the issue of intent. 
Like these cases, the evidence presented at trial showed only that defendant 
intended to restrain his boy, not to harm him. The marks on the boy's neck were 
insufficient, by themselves, to show that Peterson intended to harm his son. 
6 
GUMENT 
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY FAILED TO GRANT 
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE 
ADDUCED AT TRIAL FAILED TO SHOW THAT DEFENDANT 
INTENTIONALLY HARMED HIS CHILD AS REQUIRED BY 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-109(3)(a). 
A. U I AH CODE ANN. § 76-5-109 (2002) CREATES THREE MENTAL 
STATES OF WHICH INTENTIONAL CHII.D ABUSE IS THE HIGHEST. 
THUS, BECAUSE AI I IIIREE LEVELS INCLUDE INTENTIONAL ACTS, 
THE STATE MUST PROVE THE RESULT WAS INTENTIONAI , 
I1 , u> ,i-t 'iHerein mental states with different 
culpability levels: 
(3) Any person who inflicts upon a child physical injury or, having the care or custody of 
such child, causes or permits another to inflict physical injiiry upon a child is vutii^ of-ir 
offense as follows: 
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a class A misdemeanor; 
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a class B misdemeanor; or 
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class C misdemeanor. 
Ulali C ode Ann. §
 f\. > ; J . : \„ti : ..j :..-._ ..„-n,r n HLM iu < -i*ii I 
(\MI( I. ]'l million that a person cannot be found 
guilty of a criminal offense unless he harbors a requisite criminal state of mind or unless 
the prohibited act is ui>cu on strict ii<,.-ini: Utah v. Eltoa OM> . 
1 tin i[ ^ d and the defendant must 
be shown to have possessed a culpable or criminal state of mind, a mens rea, 'with 
respect to each element of the offense' Id at 727 (emphasis added). The Court further 
elaborates "|a|ii estabnsncw :•: •: . » . •• >; -,v *•• 
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that the doing of a wrongful act without the requisite culpable mental state does not 
constitute a crime" Id. at 727 (citations omitted). Thus, the Utah child abuse statute sets 
forth three differing mental states with corresponding levels of culpability. The offense 
of child abuse thus must include an act and also include a mental state for that act 
because it is clearly not a strict liability crime. 
1. The Plain Language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109 clearly and 
unambiguously creates three mental states with three differing levels of 
culpability. 
The structure and plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109 (2002) requires 
that in order to be convicted of class A misdemeanor child abuse, a defendant must 
intend the results of his conduct. 
The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the 
legislature in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve...Although we 
generally rely on the plain language rule of statutory construction...we note that an 
equally important rule of statutory construction is that a statute should be 
construed as a whole, with all its provisions construed to be harmonious with each 
other and with the overall legislative objective of the statute. 
Nixon v. Utah, 898 P.2d 265, 268 (P.2d 1995) (citations omitted). 
Thus, when a court is interpreting a statute, the rule is to "look first to plain 
language as the best indicator of the legislature's intent and purpose in passing the 
statute. Only if that language is ambiguous do we turn to a consideration of legislative 
history and relevant policy considerations" Provo City v. Cannoa 1999 UT App 344, P6 
(citations omitted and emphasis added). 
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The plain language of the relevant statute and a harmonious construction would 
require that a defendant not only act intentionally to be guilty of a class A misdemeanor, 
but because intent is the highest mental state with the gravest consequences, the statute 
further requires that the defendant intend the result, that is, he must have an intentional 
mental state as well. It is a well-accepted proposition in the criminal law that "the lesser 
the grading of the offense, the less culpable need be the mental state of the actor" New 
Jersey v. Demarest 599 A.2d 937, 943 (A.2d 1991). A logical consequence of that is 
that the greater grading of the offense is accompanied by a greater mental state of the 
actor. For example negligent child abuse is categorized as a class C misdemeanor in the 
child abuse statute and occurs when an actor "ought to be aware" of a substantial risk of 
injury to the child. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(4). 
Reckless child abuse is categorized as a class B misdemeanor in the child abuse 
statute and occurs when an actor is aware of a risk to the child, but chooses to 
consciously disregard that risk. This disregard of risk must be a gross deviation from the 
ordinary person standard of care. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(3). An example of 
reckless child abuse in Utah is found in Utah v. Magee, 837 P.2d 993 (Ut. Ct. App. 
1992). In this case, the Magees were parents of a four-week-old infant who suffered 
from a seizure disorder that would cause the child to become unresponsive. The parents 
used several techniques to get the infant to respond, including tapping the infant's face, 
shaking the infant, and slapping the infant with great force in the face. One day the 
parents found the infant pale and not breathing. After a struggle over the child, they 
9 
rushed the infant to the hospital. A week later the infant died after it became apparent 
the infant had "suffered severe neurological damage and it would not be possible to 
resuscitate her brain" Id. at 993. Later doctors discovered the infant had bruises on her 
face, skull fractures, brain contusions and broken ribs. Id at 994. 
The Court held the parents had to be aware that to shake an infant four-weeks-old 
and weighing little over six pounds in attempts to resuscitate the infant ran a substantial 
risk of resulting physical injury. Furthermore, the Court held that the parents consciously 
disregarded that risk and this constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care an 
ordinary person would exercise in these circumstances. Id at 997. 
Thus, it is apparent that these defendants acted intentionally. They intended to 
slap the child or shake the child. However, mere intentional acts do not make the 
defendants guilty of intentional class A misdemeanor child abuse. Because the parents' 
mental state was not to inflict injury, but rather to resuscitate their child, they were found 
guilty of the lesser charge of class B misdemeanor of reckless child abuse. 
An example of intentional child abuse under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109 is found 
in Provo City v. Cannoa 1999 UT App 344. In this case, defendant Cannon held a 
"nine-month-old son of Christine Armstrong over the railing of defendant's third-story 
apartment balcony" 1999 UT App 344. The defendant intentionally inflicted the 
emotional harm to the child in this case because there is no other rationale for his actions. 
The mens rea is apparent. However, in our case, Peterson was reacting to his child 
10 
running outside. His intention was not to harm or terrorize his child, but to retrieve his 
child from running outside of the house. 
An illumination of intent is found in Rhode Island v. Lima, 546 A.2d 770 (A.2d 
1988), where intent was a necessary element of the child abuse statute under which the 
defendant was charged. In that case, the defendant placed a child in a bathtub of hot 
water which resulted in injury to the child. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island found 
there was reversible error by the trial justice refusing to instruct the jury that an 
intentional act is required to convict under the relevant statute. The intent was not 
merely that the defendant intentionally placed the child in the water, but more 
importantly, that she intended to burn the child by placing the child in the hot water. The 
court opined that in the context of the trial justice's error, the jury may have "convicted 
defendant because she injured the child by placing him in the water, without finding that 
she inflicted injury intentionally" Id. at 772. Likewise, in our case there was an injury 
which was the result of Peterson grabbing the child to prevent him from running outside, 
however there was no evidence to suggest that Peterson intended that harm. 
2. Other Courts Have Interpreted Similarly Constructed Statutes on Child 
Abuse To Require That a Defendant Intend the Result of the Conduct. 
When other child abuse statutes break down the levels of offenses with the 
resulting penalties, as in intentional, reckless, and negligent, courts have interpreted that 
when a defendant is convicted of intentional child abuse, the state must show that the 
defendant intend the consequences of his actions. For instance, in Nebraska v. Parks, the 
11 
Nebraska Supreme Court interpreted a Nebraska statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-707 
(1995), which reads in relevant part,: 
(1) A person commits child abuse if he or she knowingly, intentionally, or 
negligently causes or permits a minor child to be..." 
and then the statute describes several resulting injuries or acts of child abuse. The statute 
further sets out penalties: 
(3) Child abuse is a Class I misdemeanor if the offense is committed 
negligently. 
(4) Child abuse is a Class IV felony if the offense is committed knowingly and 
intentionally and results in serious bodily injury as defined in such 
section... 
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-707 (1995). 
The Nebraska Supreme Court held that because the statute contains the terms 
knowingly, intentionally, or negligently accompanied with a range of penalties, as in our 
case, then the " [legislature has specifically included the defendant's state of mind as an 
element of the offense as well as a factor to be considered in determining classification of 
the offense and penalty, we interpret the...statute as defining several offenses ranging in 
severity..." Nebraska v. Parks. 573 N.W..2d 453, 458-9 (N.W.2d 1998). 
Thus, this statute is structured exactly like Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-190, in that the 
"proscribed conduct for each offense is exactly the same; it is the actor's state of mind 
which differentiates the offenses" Id, at 459. Hence, the Nebraska Supreme Court held 
that to be convicted of intentional child abuse, the defendant in Parks must have 
12 
"knowingly and intentionally punished him by exerting sufficient force to cause a spiral 
fracture." Id. at 460. The six-month-old son of the defendant in Parks was taken to the 
emergency room with a fracture or dislocation of his right femur. Id, at 455. The child 
had been in the care of the defendant when the injury occurred and initially the defendant 
denied any knowledge of the accident. Id, at 456. Furthermore, the defendant admitted 
to anger problems and eventually admitted that he injured the child unintentionally by 
grabbing his leg and flipping the child over to change his diaper while he was angry. IcL 
at 456. 
The Nebraska Supreme Court held that it was reversible error for the trial court 
not to include jury instructions for the lesser charge of negligent child abuse. The court 
held that the defendant was under stress because of an argument with his wife and that 
there is evidence he did not intend to injure the child. Id, at 460. Likewise, in our case 
the relevant Utah statute sets out different mental states and the state must prove that 
Peterson intended to hurt his son. The state did not do that and there are facts that 
support a lesser offense in this case. 
Moreover, courts often interpret child abuse statutes as not requiring the defendant 
intend the injury but only the act, but in those cases the statute does not set out the 
different mental states as does Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109. For instance, in Wisconsin 
v. Danforth, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the actor need not intend the injury, 
but only the act. Wisconsin v. Danforth. 385 N.W.2d 125, 129 (N.W.2d 1986). 
13 
However, the relevant statute did not include mental states. The relevant statute simply 
read: 
Whoever tortures a child or subjects a child to cruel maltreatment, including but 
not limited, to severe bruising, lacerations, fractured bones, internal injuries or any 
injury constituting great bodily harm under s. 939 22(14), is guilty of a Class E 
felony. 
Wis. Stat. § 940.201 (1981-2). The Wisconsin Supreme Court explicitly acknowledges 
that because "none of the terms designated....signify criminal intent...specific intent is not 
an element" Id. at 127. See also New Mexico v. Herrera. 33 P.3d 22 (N.M. Ct. App. 
2001) (The court held that child abuse is a general intent crime, thus the defendant need 
not intend the result, however the statute does not designate mental states.). Thus, the 
plain language and structure of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109, require that a defendant 
intend the act and the results of that act. 
B. THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SHOW THAT 
DEFENDANT HAD THE INTENTION TO INJURE HIS SON. 
The state did not show beyond a reasonable doubt at trial that Peterson intended to 
inflict physical injury, cause physical injury, or that Peterson was reasonably certain that 
his conduct would physically injure the boy. Thus, Peterson was entitled to have the 
court dismiss the state's case at the close of evidence. 
1. The Sufficiency Standard 
This Court has articulated the sufficiency standard as follows: 
"We reverse the jury's verdict in a criminal case when we conclude as a matter of 
law that the evidence was insufficient to warrant conviction." State v. Smith, 927 
P.2d 649, 651 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (quoting State v. Harrnan, 767 P.2d 567, 568 
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(Utah Ct. App. 1989)). The defendant must overcome a heavy burden in 
challenging the sufficiency of evidence for a jury verdict. See id.; State v. Vessey, 
967 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). "We view the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the jury verdict," State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 1985), and 
"will reverse only if the evidence is so 'inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime.'" Smith, 927 P.2d at 651 (quoting Harman, 767 P.2d at 568 
(quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983))). However, though the 
burden is high, it is not impossible. See id. "We will not make speculative leaps 
across gaps in the evidence." Id. (internal quotations and alterations omitted). 
"Every element of the crime charged must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Harman, 161 P.2d at 568. "To affirm the jury's verdict, we must be sure the State 
has introduced evidence sufficient to support all elements of the charged crime." 
Smith, 927?.2d at 651. 
State v. Gonzales. 2000 UT App 136, flO, 2 P.3d 954; see also State v. Holgate. 2000 UT 
74,1J18, 10 P.3d 346; State v. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, ^17, 993 P.2d 232. 
To succeed on a claim of insufficient evidence, the defendant "'must marshal the 
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict."' State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, TJ13, 
25 P.2d 985 (citing State v. Hopkins. 1999 UT 98,1J14, 989 P.2d 1065). This Court will 
not disturb the jury's verdict in the event admissible evidence is contradictory or 
conflicting—so long as a reasonable interpretation of that evidence supports each element 
of the offense. See Boyd, 2001 UT 30, f l4 . 
In addition, circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to support a conviction. It is 
well settled that "a conviction can be based on sufficient circumstantial evidence." State 
v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (internal quotations omitted). But the 
evidence must still be "of such quality and quantity as to justify a jury in determining 
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guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." 14 (quoting State v. Nickles. 728 P.2d 123, 127 (Utah 
1986)). 
If the state fails to establish an element of the offense with admissible evidence, 
then reversal is required. See State v. Spainhower. 1999 UT App 280, 1J5, 988 P.2d 452. 
2. The Admissible, Marshaled Evidence Failed to Support a Conviction for 
Intentional Child Abuse. 
The marshaled evidence is as follows: Peterson was supervising Matthew from 
around 10 a.m. to 4 p.m. on the afternoon of November 27, 2002. R.70 [35-36, 71]. 
When Andrea returned, Matthew had "very red, and very noticeable" marks on his neck 
which were consistent, according to a few witnesses, with a hand being placed on the 
neck. R.70 [36, 38, 40, 51]. Don lied to Andrea about how the marks got there, claiming 
they came from wrestling. R.70 [36, 40, 80-81]. Later, to Andrea, police officers, and in 
his trial testimony, Don admitted that the marks came from his attempt to prevent 
Matthew from running outside. R.70 [40, 53-54, 72-75, 80-81]. Don also told Officer 
Woffinden that he had "lost it" when Matthew ran off. R.70 [54]. Additionally, Don 
admitted that he had a problem with anger and suggested to the officer that he get 
counseling. R.70 [54]. Finally, the marks did not disappear for a couple of weeks. R.70 
[41,42]. 
There is no question that Peterson grabbed Matthew on the neck and that the marks 
were the result. But there are two bigger questions: did Peterson intend to grab the boy 
on the neck? Second, did Peterson intend to inflict those injuries on Matthew? The state 
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presented no evidence—direct or circumstantial—which would tend to indicate Peterson's 
mental state. In fact, any evidence presented at trial was quite to the contrary. There was 
no testimony that the child-victim ever spoke to anyone about what had happened. R.70 
[61]. There was no evidence Peterson had committed a prior act of violence—particularly 
an act of violence against the child. Other than the mere fact that there were marks on the 
child's neck, there was no evidence presented as to defendant's mental state other than his 
own testimony. 
Peterson testified (and he told his wife) that he was attempting to catch the boy to 
help him return to the table and finish his lunch. R.70 [40, 74-75]. Unfortunately, while 
attempting to grab the boy's shoulders, Don's hands slid to the child's neck. R.70 [74]. 
Don stated that the boy's "feet never left the ground. I grabbed him by the body, right by 
the side of the arms and led him to the table." R.70 [75]. 
Don's actions fit within none of the three possible "intentional" mental states. Don 
did not intend to inflict an injury on the boy. He reached for Matthew's shoulders, not for 
his neck. It is entirely reasonable to attempt to restrain a child by grabbing his shoulders. 
The intent was to stop the boy from going outside, not to inflict any sort of injury. Don 
also did not intend to cause an injury to the boy from his actions. In Don's own 
testimony, he affirmed that "I didn't mean to hurt my son." R.70 [78]. As he put it, "I'm 
very sorry that I hurt my son and I didn't at all want to do that. I didn't at all set out to do 
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that." R.70 [78]. Again, there is a complete lack of evidence as to Don's mental state to 
either inflict or cause an injury to the child. 
But Don must also have been free from any awareness that his actions were 
"reasonably certain" to injure Matthew. Attempting to grab a child by the shoulders is a 
reasonable action. This is not the type of behavior in which a person can reasonably 
foresee that he may injure a child. The testimony was rather that Don intended to stop 
the child. In addition, Don did not swing Matthew around nor did he lift the boy by his 
neck. Rather, he led Matthew back to the table holding his arm and body. R.70 [75]. 
Nor does circumstantial evidence establish intent. See generally: State v. Lyman, 
966 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). The following circumstantial evidence was at 
least indicative of Peterson's intent: he lied to his wife, Andrea about what had really 
happened. (R.70 [36, 40, 80-81]. Secondly, Don admitted that he had problems with 
anger and said to the officer that he had "lost it," arguably referring to his temper. R.70 
[53-54, 77-78]. Lying or covering up a crime cannot be indicative of an intent to commit 
that crime. This is because it fails to indicate defendant's mental state prior to the alleged 
crime. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 789-90 (Utah 1991). In James, the defendant took his 
own baby, killed him, wrapped him in a mattress and disposed of him in a river. I d at 
784-88. The problem was that no one witnessed the killing and the state had no evidence 
of intent, other than the body itself and how it was disposed of. This apparent 
concealment, the court said, could not be used to show defendant's intent: "Evidence of 
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elaborate efforts to conceal a crime and forestall investigation have also been held not to 
constitute evidence of intent to kill the victim." Id at 790. Quoting the Colorado Supreme 
Court, the Court said: 
The fact that defendant buried the body, repeatedly lied concerning the 
disappearance of [his wife], went under an assumed name and, while awaiting 
trial, escaped from jail, was properly submitted to the jury as evidence of guilt and 
consciousness of guilt, but the same does not serve to supply the missing element 
of malice. 
I d (quoting Stafford v. People, 388 P.2d 774, 778 (Colo. 1964)). Issuing its own holding, 
the court said, "evidence of. . . concealment of a crime does not support an inference of 
intentional conduct on the part of the accused. Therefore, other evidence of the 
defendant's intent must be present in the record to support the jury's verdict." Id 
Peterson's acknowledgment to the officer that he "lost it" when the boy ran also 
does not show intentional conduct. The Utah Supreme Court has held that there was 
insufficient evidence to convict for intentional conduct on a second-degree murder 
charge. State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985). In that case, the victim was found 
dead, lying spread-eagled in her bed. Id at 1215. She was surrounded by sexual 
paraphernalia. I d Items were scattered about the apartment—an apparent burglary. Id 
Bolsinger had been seen leaving a bar with the victim the night before she died. I d He 
was arrested, and he confessed. Id He stated that the parties left the bar, returned to the 
victim's home, danced, and drank a bottle of whisky. Id At the point when both were 
extremely intoxicated, they engaged in sexual intercourse—Bolsinger on top. Id During 
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intercourse, the victim picked up a radio, wrapped the cord around her neck and asked 
Bolsinger to pull. Id He pulled in a manner "like tying [one's] shoes" for several seconds 
and then released it. Id. at 1216. Apparently the victim went unconscious; Bolsinger 
became scared, dumped the victim's purse, took a stereo, and left. Id There was no 
physical evidence of a struggle or injury to the victim other than a 4-inch ligature 
abrasion on one side of the neck and a 3-inch one on the other side. Id The Court found 
that this evidence was insufficient to show that Bolsinger's mental state. Id at 1218-21. 
In fact, the confession failed to establish that Bolsinger had an intentional mental state: 
Both in the confession and at trial, the defendant denied having intended any harm. 
No words, angry or otherwise, were exchanged by the couple. Defendant was not 
mad. There was no struggle. He was on top of the victim when he pulled the cord 
for what may have been no more than thirty seconds. The physical evidence is 
undisputed with respect to the absence of a struggle and to the position of the 
defendant when he pulled on the cord. Given those facts, reasonable minds must 
perforce entertain reasonable doubt that there was that degree of awareness with 
respect to the defendant's conduct and surrounding circumstances to impute to him 
the knowledge that his conduct created a grave risk of killing Kaysie and that he 
possessed the medical knowledge that compounding factors existed which would 
hasten her death. 
Id at 1219. On the other hand, the court found that the conduct was more reckless than 
intentional and mitigated the offense. Id at 1219-20. Pulling a cord around one's neck 
constitutes a gross deviation from the ordinary person standard of care, the court said. Id 
The evidence in this case is not unlike the Bolsinger case in that at worst this 
constitutes reckless conduct, not intentional. According to the state's evidence, even if 
defendant lost his cool and grabbed the child's neck, his conduct could not have been 
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intentional. He had no desire to harm the child. He intended to reach for his shoulders and 
stop him—not to grab his neck and harm him. The state presented nothing showing that 
Peterson ever intended to harm his son. No evidence was introduced of the child's 
statements—if there were any. In short, like Bolsinger, none of the state's evidence could 
point to intentional conduct on Peterson's part. 
In addition, this case is exactly like Bolsinger in that the only evidence of what 
occurred consists of marks on a victim's neck and the defendant's own testimony of what 
happened. In Bolsinger, the Court found this evidence insufficient to implicate 
defendant's mental state as intentional. In this case, this Court should do the same. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant requests that this Court enter an order reversing his conviction for 
intentional child abuse on the grounds that the state presented insufficient evidence to 
prove that his conduct was intentional. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this m** day of February, 2004. 
WESLEY J. HOWARD 
AttoroeyJ^r Defendant/Appellant 
21 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, WESLEY J. HOWARD, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered 
an original and seven copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South 
State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and two copies to the District Attorney's 
Office at 2001 South State Street, Suite S3700, Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200, this &H<** 
day of February, 2004. 
WESLEY J. HOWARD 
DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the District Attorney's Office as 
indicated above this day of February, 2004. 
22 
ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SANDY COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
DON ENOCH PETERSON, 
Defendant, 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 031400088 MO 
Judge: DENISE P. LINDBERG 
Date: July 31, 2003 
PRESENT 
Clerk: vickielc 
Prosecutor: GARDNER, BRIAN J 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): HOWARD, WESLEY J 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: September 3, 1972 
Audio 
Tape Number: 03-220 / 221 Tape Count: 6520 / 0001 
CHARGES 
1. CHILD ABUSE/NEGLECT - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 07/14/2003 Guilty 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of CHILD ABUSE/NEGLECT a Class 
A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) 
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Page 1 
Case No: 031400088 
Date: Jul 31, 2003 
THE COURT ORDERS THE DEFENDANT TO SERVED 3 65 DAYS JAIL, CONSECUTIVE 
TO ANY OTHER TIME NOW SERVING. THE DEFENDANT TO NOT BE PLACED ON 
ANKLE MONITOR, OR WORK RELEASE. 
ADDENDUM B 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (2003) 
§ 76-2-103. Definitions 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to 
a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or 
cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing 
circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his 
conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or 
the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such 
a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that 
an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial 
and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of 
such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from 
the actor's standpoint. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109 (2003) 
§ 76-5-109. Child abuse 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Child" means a human being who is under 18 years of age. 
(b) "Child abuse" means any offense described in Subsection (2) or (3), or in Section 76-5-
109.1. 
(c) "Physical injury" means an injury to or condition of a child which impairs the physical 
condition of the child, including: 
(i) a bruise or other contusion of the skin; 
(ii) a minor laceration or abrasion; 
(iii) failure to thrive or malnutrition; or 
(iv) any other condition which imperils the child's health or welfare and which is not a 
serious physical injury as defined in Subsection (l)(d). 
(d) "Serious physical injury" means any physical injury or set of injuries which seriously 
impairs the child's health, or which involves physical torture or causes serious emotional harm 
to the child, or which involves a substantial risk of death to the child, including: 
(i) fracture of any bone or bones; 
(ii) intracranial bleeding, swelling or contusion of the brain, whether caused by blows, 
shaking, or causing the child's head to impact with an object or surface; 
(iii) any burn, including burns inflicted by hot water, or those caused by placing a hot 
object upon the skin or body of the child; 
(iv) any injury caused by use of a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; 
(v) any combination of two or more physical injuries inflicted by the same person, either 
at the same time or on different occasions; 
(vi) any damage to internal organs of the body; 
(vii) any conduct toward a child which results in severe emotional harm, severe 
developmental delay or retardation, or severe impairment of the child's ability to function; 
(viii) any injury which creates a permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or 
impairment of the function of a bodily member, limb, or organ; 
(ix) any conduct which causes a child to cease breathing, even if resuscitation is 
successful following the conduct; or 
(x) any conduct which results in starvation or failure to thrive or malnutrition that 
jeopardizes the child's life. 
(2) Any person who inflicts upon a child serious physical injury or, having the care or 
custody of such child, causes or permits another to inflict serious physical injury upon a child 
is guilty of an offense as follows: 
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a felony of the second degree; 
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a felony of the third degree; or 
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Any person who inflicts upon a child physical injury or, having the care or custody of 
such child, causes or permits another to inflict physical injury upon a child is guilty of an 
offense as follows: 
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a class A misdemeanor; 
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a class B misdemeanor; or 
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class C misdemeanor. 
(4) A parent or legal guardian who provides a child with treatment by spiritual means alone 
through prayer, in lieu of medical treatment, in accordance with the tenets and practices of an 
established church or religious denomination of which the parent or legal guardian is a member 
or adherent shall not, for that reason alone, be deemed to have committed an offense under this 
section. 
